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Successive bloody incidents occurred in 
Jerusalem during the first half of 2014 that 
surprised and shocked observers on both 
sides of the “Green Line,” especially since the 
general conviction prevailing amongst them 
was that “the issue of Jerusalem is over”; that 
the occupation had succeeded in taking full 
control of the land and its people; and that the 
process of unification and annexation had been 
crowned with success, so that now many of 
Jerusalem’s youth now taste nothing other than 
Israeli products, spend all their time in West 
Jerusalem, and listen only to Hebrew songs; 
that thousands of them have obtained or desire 
to obtain Israeli citizenship; that the plan for 
the complete separation of Jerusalem and the 
West Bank has been realized through the rings 
of settlements, diversionary roads, and the so-
called separation wall; that the Palestinian sector 
of Jerusalem’s economy has been completely 
destroyed and made totally subordinate to 
Israel’s as a marginal service economy; and, 
finally, that the Israeli occupation has dealt a 
deathblow to the institutional infrastructure and 
suppressed Jerusalem’s Palestinian political elite.
It would please Israeli politicians to declare, 
with pride and self-aggrandizement, that 
Jerusalem’s Palestinians desire to link their fate 
with that of Israel rather than with the Palestinian 
Authority. They are used to higher incomes 
compared with the incomes of their compatriots 
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. They have 
grown accustomed to advanced health and social 
security services, since families with numerous 
children receive support from national insurance, 
while retirees and widowers receive financial 
aid. The citizens of Jerusalem will therefore 
never give up all these benefits in order to join 
the “failed” Palestinian Authority. For all these 
reasons, “United Jerusalem will remain the 
eternal capital of the state of Israel,” a matter on 
which the majority of Zionist political factions 
have reached consensus.
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The truth of the matter is that, in the mind of the colonized, the colonists have failed, 
everywhere and at all times. Israeli Orientalism is no different than Western Orientalism in 
its inability to comprehend the behavior of peoples yearning for freedom and independence. 
France did not grasp this in Algeria, nor Britain in India, nor Israel in Lebanon. Israel 
failed to read the writing on the wall in 1987, when the first intifada broke out, nor did it 
anticipate, with all the tools at its disposal, the al-Aqsa intifada of 2000. Similarly, it was 
incapable of realizing the extent of Gaza’s ability to resist and hold out in 2014. It also 
failed to understand Jerusalem society, which it holds in its hands and over which it keeps 
constant watch.
Such lack of foresight and comprehension can be attributed to a number of factors, 
and looking into all of them is beyond the scope of this essay. Yet certainly one factor 
is that the colonizers were and will remain foolish, caught up in the tattered remains of 
power that obstruct their perception, and so they fail to recognize the true force driving 
the rebellion against them. They thus conjure up justifications and rationalizations with 
which to convince themselves, so that with the passage of time these turn into a part of their 
colonial ideology. In the Palestinian case, the Israelis have persuaded themselves to believe 
religious and historical pretexts that gradually became rationalizations for a racism that was 
inherent in them from the start. These were the embodiment of a national, cultural, and class 
superiority that the Israeli colonizers tirelessly transformed into legal formulations designed 
to sanction their racism, and from which they invoke support as if those were “legal rights.” 
They also attempt to conceal the defectiveness of such formulations by camouflaging them 
with misleading terms, such as “democracy,” “equality,” “tolerance,” and “coexistence.”
While on the subject of deception one can point to the many Israeli politicians, of all 
colors and hues, but most particularly those on the right, who proceeded to make visits to 
the supposedly bilingual school called “Hand in Hand” at Bayt Safafa. This school was 
subjected to an arson attack by the racist group Lehava on 30 November 2014, which left 
graffiti on its walls proclaiming: “No coexistence with cancer,” “Death to the Arabs,” and 
“Kahane was right.”1 This organization is dedicated to preventing Jewish women from 
marrying Palestinians, while brandishing its motto of “Jewish women for Jewish men.” 
They are a racist, Rightist organization. So those politicians came to the school, apparently 
surprised at what had happened, failing to understand that what occurred was a very natural 
consequence of incessant racist incitement against Palestinians, and of the widespread 
dissemination through Israeli public discourse of established prejudice against them, a 
prejudice that is no longer disguised in statements issued by the government or political 
parties in Israel. Although research institutes in Israel conduct advanced work in many 
areas, a high level of denial of reality nevertheless dominates Israeli society generally, and 
the ruling establishment particularly.
Five decades of colonial control have uncovered and made distinct a multitude of political 
and racist values as well as groups with multiple interests. Settlers who manage to steal land 
and find a government agency behind them to legalize that theft, and then to offer them 
protection and financial support, will surely come to believe in their racial superiority in 
practical terms, after having believed in it in ideological and religious terms. The Israeli 
colonial project has moved from the phase of being concerned with seizing control of the 
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land, and slowly gnawing away at more of it, to the phase of the theoretical legalization 
of colonial thinking, digging into ancient and modern history to support its myths. This 
phase is taking place within the larger context of putting together the paperwork needed to 
support a racist system of apartheid.
How then are we to understand what has happened in Jerusalem during the past year? 
Is it the result of the horrible murder of the child Mohammed Abu Khdeir? Or of increased 
pressure on the al-Aqsa mosque? Or settler voracity that has extended into the very heart 
of Palestinian Jerusalem?
Certainly all the above played an important role in what the city and its suburbs have 
experienced, but it is not enough to explain what has taken place over the past year, which 
has involved various neighborhoods of Jerusalem. Examining the socio-economic context 
will help give a clearer picture. Doubtless this will complement the national-political 
context of liberation, and cannot to be seen as separate from it. Likewise, it is inseparable 
from the religious dimension that is gradually turning into a central feature of the conflict, 
particularly in Jerusalem, a city that encompasses the al-Aqsa mosque. And of course, these 
can never be separated from the overarching question of Palestine: blocked horizons, the war 
on Gaza, the failed attempts at reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas, the economic and 
social problems of Palestinian society, and ongoing political and economic developments.
Annexation and Economic Marginalization
The 1967 conquest of Jerusalem did not affect the city’s economy any differently than 
it did the economy of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, despite the fact that Israeli law 
was imposed on Jerusalem while Israeli military rule was imposed on the rest of the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip. The fragile economies of the occupied territories collapsed in 
face of the relatively advanced Israeli capitalist economy. As a result of Israel’s victory in 
the war, its seizing control of vast areas of Egyptian, Palestinian, and Syrian territory, the 
expansion of global capitalism in the 1970s, and the huge growth of the tourism industry, 
Israel’s economy grew at an accelerated rate. This created a need for cheap labor, which 
was amply supplied by Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza. Cheap Palestinian hired 
labor in Israel’s workshops and in agriculture led to a decline in production in the occupied 
territories, transforming them gradually not only into sources of cheap labor but also to 
markets for Israeli consumer products. These changes had a long-term effect on land use, 
specifically in the West Bank, where paid labor became more lucrative than working on 
the land or in small industries. Further, Palestinian products could not rival their Israeli 
counterparts, so small and medium-sized industries also collapsed.
These changes had more dramatic effects in Jerusalem than in the rest of the occupied 
territories, because the city’s economy historically depended on services, trade, and tourism, 
sectors over which Israel was quick to take direct control following the occupation. The 
rule of occupation took over all Arab public and municipal institutions, incorporating them 
into the corresponding institutions in West Jerusalem. The Arab (Jordanian) Jerusalem 
Governorate (amana) was dissolved, and all branches of the Jerusalem municipality were 
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incorporated into the Israeli municipality, with Israelis appointed to administer them. Bit 
by bit, Israel sought to dismantle Palestinian institutions in the city by drying up their 
funding, subjecting them to strict monitoring, and transferring various services to Israeli 
organizations. The crowning achievement of this policy was inclusion of the inhabitants of 
Jerusalem in the Israeli social security (national insurance) and the health insurance systems. 
Joining the social security and health systems was not a matter of choice; it was made 
compulsory, and remains so until today. This further bound the Palestinians of Jerusalem to 
the Israeli social services system, so that thousands of qualified Palestinians lost their jobs 
as a result. Most dangerous of all, however, was the political dimension of this annexation, 
since it makes disengaging the two sectors of the city a very difficult operation, one that 
was gradually made so intricate and complex to the point of becoming impossible.
What interests us here is understanding where matters stand at this point in time, 
and explaining the tragic conditions in which the Palestinians of Jerusalem are living. 
The Association for Civil Rights in Israel has published its 2014 report, which states 
that three-fourths of the inhabitants of East Jerusalem live below the poverty line.2 This 
comes as no surprise to any observer of the gradually deteriorating conditions of the city. 
It was possible to predict this fact when it became known that 40 percent of Jerusalem’s 
Palestinian students do not complete their education, flocking instead to a job market that 
is open to cheap unskilled labor with short-term work opportunities that often lead to long-
term unemployment.3 It appears that the poverty rate for Arab Jerusalem enjoys a degree 
of stability; the National Insurance Institute of Israel affirmed in 2011 that 79.5 percent 
of the city’s Palestinian inhabitants live below the poverty line,4 a rate almost identical to 
the figure for 2104, whereas the cost of living in Israel is rapidly rising at rates higher than 
the rate of wage increases for Jerusalem’s Arab population. It gets worse with Jerusalem’s 
children, 85 percent of whom belong to families living below the poverty line. 
According to a 2011 study published by the Jerusalem-based institute al-Maqdese for 
Society Development, since 1999 around 5,000 economic establishments, mostly engaged 
in trade, were shut down.5 A number of these were located in the Old City. The industrial 
sector has been in such rapid recession that it no longer constitutes a significant portion 
of Jerusalem’s economy. Other sectors, such as services and tourism, have also suffered 
recession, as will be discussed later.
Of course there are multiple reasons for this recession, yet a central one is the isolation 
of Jerusalem. The number of shoppers in the city has been approximately halved as a 
result of the construction of the racist separation wall, which has had a catastrophic effect 
on Jerusalem’s economy.6 Adding to Jerusalem’s economic woes is the obvious disparity 
in prices between Jerusalem’s markets and those in the West Bank, which surround the 
city on all sides. This drives Jerusalem’s shoppers to West Bank markets. It is important 
to recall that the Jerusalem market suffers from high costs primarily due to having been 
linked to Israel’s economy, and to being made subject to higher taxes in comparison with 
West Bank markets.
Due to the cultural and religious significance of the city, tourism, both international 
and local, is one of the important economic sectors in the eastern part of Jerusalem. 
Taking together all its various components, this sector constitutes nearly 40 percent of 
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Jerusalem’s total economy. Israeli settlement activity in and around Jerusalem has affected 
the tourism sector in many ways and contributed significantly to the recession of the 
tourism sector. Among these is settlers’ seizure of land needed for the construction of 
hotels and tourist resorts; settlers’ control over archaeological and historical sites; Israeli 
control of crossing points and the movement of tourists; and the restrictions Israel imposes 
on tourist activity in the West Bank, including Jerusalem.7 Of course political instability 
and uncertain security conditions hang permanently like a sword over the head of the 
tourism sector. After every intifada or war on Gaza or Lebanon, this sector is dealt a hard 
blow the effects of which continue for an entire year at the lowest estimate. Recovery is 
barely complete before a new blow is struck. 
Preparations for the millennium in 2000 involving huge investments may be seen as 
an example of what this sector endures. Palestinian companies readied themselves to greet 
the third millennium, borrowing huge amounts of money from Israeli banks to purchase 
new buses to accommodate the great surge of visitors and pilgrims expected to come to 
Jerusalem for the celebrations. But the second millennium came to an end with the intifada. 
Tourism came to an almost complete standstill. The banks began to demand that the tourist 
transport companies repay their loans, while the new buses depreciated in value before 
ever having been used. In mid-2002, these numbered 220 tourism vehicles, and with the 
companies’ inability to repay their loans more than 70 of these buses were sold, some at 
auction for a pittance, after the banks had taken possession of them. So the number of tourist 
buses dropped below 60. Furthermore Israeli competition in the tourism sector is brutal: 
the Israelis dominate all the capabilities of this market. Israeli tourism companies are in 
full control of large tour operators, deciding where they lodge, what they visit, where they 
shop, and where they eat. Thus all that is left for Arab Jerusalem are the crumbs.
Hotels and hotel rooms may be used as another gauge of what Jerusalem tourism has 
been reduced to, regardless of the rate of occupancy, seasonal occupancy, and the successive 
misfortunes suffered by Jerusalem hotels. This can be seen from the following table:
Table 1: Number of Hotels and Hotel Rooms in Jerusalem8
Year No. of Hotels No. of Rooms
2000 43 1,997
2001 29 836
2002 21 915
2003 20 907
2004 23 985
2005 18 867
2006 22 1,209
2007 25 1,249
2008 29 1,317
2009 34 1,580
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It should be noted that the number of hotel rooms in Jerusalem in the year 1966 had 
risen to as high as 2,200. This does not only indicate that practically no new hotels were 
built after 1967; it also shows that the number of rooms decreased noticeably. Some 
hotels were closed down, and only one new hotel was built after 1967, the 60-room 
Addar Hotel. Meanwhile, Israelis have established more than 2,000 hotel rooms in Arab 
Jerusalem since 1967, and there are plans to build a similar number in existing and future 
settlements in Jerusalem.
The other problem Jerusalem hotels are facing is competition from Bethlehem hotels, 
which charge a rate of U.S.$30 per night, sometimes even less. Because operational costs 
in Jerusalem are so high, rising almost as high as those of Israeli hotels, the ability to 
compete against Bethlehem hotels has been all but lost.
In brief, Jerusalem’s economy is linked to a number of factors that have shaped and 
influenced it. These are mostly negative factors, and may be summarized as follows:
·	 Settlement activity and the wall, the economic effects of which will be discussed below.
·	 The nature of the Israeli job market, which seeks unskilled labor, especially in the 
sectors of janitorial or cleaning services, construction, and transport. The Israeli job 
market offers low-paying jobs requiring no professional or technical skills. These 
are temporary jobs for the most part, so that the worker regularly moves from one 
job to the next.
·	 The loss of industrial workshops to the extent that no industrial area is left in Arab 
Jerusalem. What remains of the industrial area in Wadi al-Jawz has been given over 
to car repair shops, and even these are decreasing in number as the entire area is 
changing into a market for foodstuffs and construction materials. As for the second 
industrial area in the village of ‘Anata, which neighbors Jerusalem, that too has been 
given over to car repair shops, and the racist separation wall now completely severs 
it from Jerusalem.
·	 The lack of national banks in Jerusalem. Israeli banks do not grant developmental 
loans to Palestinians for lack of guarantees sufficient to meet their requirements. 
Furthermore, the Palestinian investor fears that these banks will seize their facilities 
or real estate holdings should they fail to repay their loans, and thus their property 
will end up in the hands of settlers. Financing poses a serious problem for Jerusalem 
investors, one for which no solution has yet been found.
·	 The decline in the standard of education, which is regarded as the lifeblood of economic 
growth and development.
Settlement Activity and Control over the Land
Land is national and private capital, and a central foundation of economic development. 
Only around 13 percent of the area of their city remains for the Palestinian population of 
Jerusalem. This has cost them a major resource for economic development and growth, 
in addition to the loss of other resources that have been marginalized, annexed, or 
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otherwise blatantly turned over to the settlers or the state of Israel to exploit.9 Notably, the 
settlements have usurped over 35 percent of land in East Jerusalem, that is, almost three 
times the land allocated to Palestinians. Of course these figures are not entirely accurate, 
since they do not account for settler infiltration into Palestinian neighborhoods such as 
Shaykh Jarrah, Silwan, Ras al-‘Amud, al-Tur (Mount of Olives), and the Old City. The 
remaining land is divided into two parts: the first is given to infrastructure and parks, 
comprising nearly 22 percent; the second comprises 30 percent of East Jerusalem land 
that has not yet been zoned. This does not mean that it will not go to the settlers, or held 
in reserve for future settlements that will contribute to the realization of the aim of seizing 
the whole of Jerusalem. That is a certainty, given what can be understood from Israeli 
schemes to ensure that these lands will never belong to Palestinians, no matter how dire 
their situation might become. Thus economic development in the city is assured through 
land for settlers, and will never serve the interests of Palestinian investors. Even if we 
assume, for the sake of argument, that there are Palestinian investors who are willing to 
invest in Jerusalem despite its complicated and discouraging conditions, and that they 
desire to invest in building a new hotel: where will they find land on which to build? And 
should such land be found, its cost would be unaffordable and prohibitive to investment.
We will not discuss settlement activity and its infrastructure in Jerusalem, since these 
have been dealt with in many detailed studies. The socioeconomic effect of the settlements 
on Jerusalem has been, suffice it to say, immense. For in addition to the policy of land 
grabbing, they have impoverished Jerusalem and its population, strangled its growth and 
development, and to a large extent destroyed its future. Jewish settlement activity has 
cut off all of Jerusalem’s connections, turning Palestinian neighborhoods into scattered 
enclaves, so that the social fabric of the city has been totally lost.
The “Separation Wall” and Its Socioeconomic Effects
The length of the wall in the district of Jerusalem has reached 142 kilometers, and in some 
areas it has penetrated as deeply as 14 kilometers into the West Bank (beyond the borders 
of the annexed municipality of Jerusalem). The wall has encompassed most settlements 
close to Jerusalem within the urban spread of the city. This means that it has de facto 
annexed these settlements to Israel, along with those that originally were constructed 
within the city’s municipal boundaries. The wall thus succeeded in isolating Jerusalem 
and its surroundings from the West Bank, and with the use of military checkpoints 
and barriers it has restricted the social, economic, and service-related connections of 
Jerusalem’s population with the West Bank, thereby placing the movements of the 
inhabitants of Jerusalem fully under its control. It further excluded some Palestinian 
neighborhoods – such as Kafr ‘Aqab and Shu‘fat refugee camp – so that “legally” they 
were kept within Israeli Jerusalem’s municipal boundaries, in spite of the total absence 
of municipal services in those neighborhoods. They thus became in effect part of the 
West Bank, and it is possible to say that they became areas with no responsible authority, 
were illegal and unregulated codes prevail.
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The wall restricts population movement, so that an inhabitant of Jerusalem who 
needs to pass through the checkpoints on a daily basis spends an average of three to four 
hours just to cross. This is a drain of time, money, and energy, in addition to the daily 
provocation and humiliation entailed. We can only imagine the results of such a daily 
ordeal throughout the past twenty-one years. Most of Jerusalem’s college students study 
at the universities of Birzeit, al-Quds (in Abu Dis), and Bethlehem; these youngsters were 
born under the shadow of the wall, and must cross it daily. It is easy to guess how they 
must feel, and what their future political leanings will be.
The wall has torn to shreds the urban social fabric of Jerusalem society. Not 
infrequently we find one half of a family living in al-Ram, Abu Dis, or Bir Nabala, or 
elsewhere, while the other half of the same family lives behind the wall. Furthermore, 
Jerusalem has lost its rural surroundings, along with the capability to fill its breadbasket, 
and its consumer capacity, both of which intensify the Jerusalem market’s subordination 
to Israeli producers.10 The wall has swallowed up vast swathes of land that comprised 
the rural reserves of Arab Jerusalem, the space for its urban expansion, thereby imposing 
on it geopolitical facts on the ground. Productive markets disintegrated, new markets 
emerged, and the wall changed the relationship between human beings and their habitat, 
and deepened the alienation of Palestinians from their environment.11
The construction of the wall led to long-term effects on the quality of goods that are 
traded in the city’s markets and to an obvious decline of trade in Jerusalem’s products, 
in addition to diminishing of its social role. The wall struck a hard blow to Jerusalem’s 
economy, in which trade takes second place after tourism.12 A large number of shops 
shuttered their doors, especially in the southern markets, such as the spice and perfumes 
(‘attarin) market, the butchers’ (lahhamin) market, the textile (khawajat) and cotton 
(qattanin) markets offering traditional garments, and Bab al-Silsila’s antiques and 
souvenirs market. Even markets that used to be crowded with shoppers, such as Khan al-
Zayt, are suffering from permanent stagnation. An increasing number of small tradesmen 
are joining the Israeli job market, now that their trades are failing to bring in even the 
lowest incomes.
It is worth mentioning that Palestinians living in areas occupied in 1948 made energetic 
efforts to revive commerce in Jerusalem by organizing day trips to the city from Palestinian 
villages and towns inside Israel for shopping, as well as worshipping in the sacred precincts 
of the al-Aqsa mosque. These activities significantly reduced the suffering of Jerusalem 
traders, particularly in areas close to the al-Aqsa mosque, but they were not sufficient for 
the markets to recover. The same Palestinians also developed tourist travel to Jerusalem, 
Jericho, Bethlehem, and Ramallah for holidays and vacations, after increased subjection 
to racism at Israeli hotels and resorts led to diminishing interest in those destinations.
The Decline in Living Conditions
A study by the Israeli organization Ir Amim states that Palestinian population growth 
has created a need for a minimum of 1,500 housing units annually,13 while the number 
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of permits granted for residential construction in the best and most active years does not 
exceed 400 units. This leads to overcrowding and homelessness in the city. Of course, 
the number of permits issued annually does not exceed a few dozen, and only rarely did 
the number actually reach 400. In some years the number does not exceed the number of 
Arab residential units that the occupation demolishes in Jerusalem. For example, between 
2000 and 2010 a total of 839 buildings were demolished, with the peak occurring in 2004 
when 133 buildings were destroyed (see Table 2).14
Table 2: Arab Buildings Destroyed  
by Israeli Authorities in East Jerusalem, 2000–2014
Year No. of Buildings Demolished
2000 16
2001 41
2002 45
2003 99
2004 133
2005 90
2006 81
2007 75
2008 93
2009 84
2010 82
2011 48
2012 36
2013 84
2014 36
The Israeli human rights organization B’Tselem reports that the number of those displaced 
or rendered homeless as a result of home demolitions in the ten years between 2004 and 
2014 was 2,028 Palestinians, including 1,108 minors. The same organization states that 
59 Palestinians demolished their own homes between 2008 and 2015 in order to avoid 
paying the exorbitant demolition costs the municipality would have charged them for 
the service.
Israel persists in its policy of home demolition in Jerusalem, and because of the 
widespread popular resistance activity the city of Jerusalem witnessed in the second half 
of 2014, Israeli home demolitions increased. Israel’s minister of public security Yitzhak 
Aharonovich stated on 19 November 2014 that Israel will promptly demolish homes in 
Jerusalem as collective punishment for resistance.15
The districts now lying outside the racist separation wall (for example, Kafr ‘Aqab) are 
the fastest growing of the Arab quarters of Jerusalem. This is because just one high-rise 
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residential building can contain forty or more apartments, more than the number built in 
Jerusalem neighborhoods inside the wall in an entire year.
Of course Jerusalem’s inhabitants are not waiting for a magical solution. They have 
to build homes for themselves in any way possible. Since there is no land available they 
have to devise other solutions, such as subdividing existing apartments into smaller 
ones, randomly adding what can be added to existing structures, and building around an 
existing house by sacrificing the surrounding garden. All the specialists in Jerusalem agree 
that the number of unlicensed dwellings is in the vicinity of twenty thousand residential 
units. Assuming that each family consists of only five people, that means that there are 
100,000 Palestinians living in unlicensed homes, which in turn means that the threat of 
home demolition permanently hangs over their heads, and they can never know when the 
occupation’s bulldozer will arrive to destroy their home. The psycho-social dimensions 
of such a situation have a tremendous effect on people’s lives.
This process has resulted in entire districts of squatter areas, so that it is possible to 
say that these now constitute three-quarters of Jerusalem’s Palestinian neighborhoods. 
If we link this to the rate of poverty, which is over 78 percent, we get a clear picture of 
where matters now stand. All the ills associated with poverty worldwide are taking root 
in these districts: general violence, domestic violence, early school truancy, drug use, 
social alienation, and others. The housing crisis, cramped living space, and inability to 
purchase or rent homes has resulted a decline in the birth rate, so that the average family 
size in the district of Jerusalem was 4.7 members in 2010, compared with 5.7 members 
in 2005.16 Naturally there is a difference between those living within the wall and those 
living outside it. Since the statistics available are for the entire district of Jerusalem, 
which includes parts of the West Bank where housing conditions are very different and 
family size is larger, it is possible to say that the average size of the Jerusalem family 
living within the wall is less than 4.5 members.
The fact that many families in Jerusalem are compelled to share an apartment with 
newlywed sons, and that those newlyweds have to live with their parents, is causing the 
Jerusalem family to regress to where it had been decades ago. It also runs counter to the 
nature of socio-economic development, since it revives the extended family, which had 
almost disappeared in the 1970s. This has a regressive effect on Jerusalem society, over 
and above its effect on psychosocial wellbeing.
Residency Requirements
Permanent residence – held by Palestinian residents of Jerusalem – is completely different 
from citizenship. Israeli regulations have made clear distinctions between the two,17 
with permanent residency rights contingent on the approval of the Israeli ministry of 
the interior, thus acting as a sword hanging over the heads of Jerusalem’s Palestinian 
inhabitants. These regulations restrict their freedom of movement, and make any kind 
of socio-economic development impossible.18 For example, young men and women in 
Jerusalem have to think long and hard before marrying. If a young man marries a West 
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Bank resident, he assures himself endless suffering. And an inhabitant of Jerusalem dares 
not leave Jerusalem to reside in the West Bank, often just a few meters away from the 
municipal boundaries of Jerusalem (as delineated by the occupation), to avoid having 
his “center of life” determined to exist outside Jerusalem: that would lead to his being 
stripped of his right to reside in the city. And since the means of livelihood in the city 
have been limited to the narrowest extent, a number of Jerusalem’s inhabitants have 
sought their livelihood outside Palestine. But should they stay away longer than seven 
years, they are liable to being stripped of their right to Jerusalem residency, as well as 
their right to reside anywhere in Palestine, including in the areas subject to the Palestinian 
Authority, since they will be denied re-entry into Palestine.19 The Israeli ministry of the 
interior keeps constant and close watch over Jerusalem inhabitants – particularly in this 
digital age when citizens cannot conceal their movements – investigating and verifying 
their “center of life” whenever they:
·	 register a newborn, regardless of whether the parents are inhabitants of Jerusalem, or 
one is from Jerusalem while the other resides in the area governed by the Palestinian 
Authority, or whether the child was born outside Palestine due to reasons of work, 
study, or anything else;
·	 obtain an identity card for the first time, or replace a damaged or lost identity card;
·	 make any changes to an identity card, such as a change of address or marital status;
·	 apply for travel documentation (laissez-passer);
·	 cross borders, whether via Jordan or through Tel Aviv (Lydda) Airport;
·	 apply for health insurance; 
·	 apply for social security (national insurance); or
·	 apply for a pension.20
As part of the policy of suppressing Jerusalem’s inhabitants, restricting their freedoms, 
and getting rid of the largest possible number of them, the regulations governing family 
reunification are invoked. A Jerusalem woman married to a man residing in the West 
Bank is only allowed to apply for family reunification after her husband attains the 
age of 35 years, and before she reaches 25 years of age. The same regulation applies 
to a Jerusalem man married to a young woman from the West Bank.21 Thus, there are 
thousands of families that suffer great hardships. Children suffer as a result of not being 
registered in their parents’ identity card, and must endure the consequences of such a 
situation when one of their parents needs to reside in Jerusalem while the other has to 
reside in the West Bank. Even if the parents succeed in finding an apartment in one of 
the “lost districts” behind the wall,22 one of them will have to pass through the abhorrent 
checkpoints on a daily basis. Around ten thousand Palestinian children in Jerusalem are 
estimated to be unregistered in their parents’ identity cards due to an uncertain “legal 
status” (meaning their right to reside in Jerusalem), because one of the parents does not 
possess a Jerusalem identity card.23
During the past few years of occupation, more than fifteen thousand Palestinians 
have had their right to reside in Jerusalem revoked by Israel. This figure does not include 
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the tens of thousands of Jerusalem citizens who have been denied the right of return to 
the city following the war of 1967 because they were outside of Palestine, or even in 
the West Bank, during the war. Nor does the figure include those who were exiled for 
political reasons. The policy of stripping away the right of residence reached its peak in 
2008, when the number of those who were denied this right reached 4,577 Palestinians, 
or one-third of the total number for the years for which we have statistics. The number 
for 2006 was around 1,363 Palestinians, 1,067 for the year 2007.24
Most disturbing to the Palestinian inhabitants of Jerusalem, and a criminal violation 
of their human rights, is that their presence in the city depends on Israel’s good will and 
charity, rather than deriving from their natural rights. They are temporary residents, at the 
mercy of the Israeli authorities who can expel them and, either temporarily or permanently, 
strip them of their right to live in their own home. In 2010 and 2011, Israel deported 
three members of the Palestinian Parliament from their city of Jerusalem to the West 
Bank.25 More recently, Daoud al-Ghoul, development coordinator for the Health Work 
Committees, was banished from Jerusalem for five months, and from the West Bank for 
six. This ban was recently renewed for a second term. To the best of my knowledge, this 
is the first case of an inhabitant of Jerusalem being banished from the entire West Bank. 
The occupation authorities usually either deport Jerusalem residents outside Palestine, or 
forbid them entry to the West Bank and impose compulsory residence on them.26 Deporting 
them outside the West Bank, however, is a new phenomenon, hitherto unknown, which 
has forced Daoud al-Ghoul to take up residence in Haifa.27 
Closing Down Institutions
After state and municipal institutions were subsumed by Israeli institutions following the 
1967 war, Jerusalem society proceeded to develop civil society institutions to provide the 
essential services needed to stand fast and resist the imposed annexation. The Palestinians 
of Jerusalem grew to depend on these institutions in various areas: education, health, 
culture, sports and youth affairs, and social services. The occupation regime perpetually 
harassed Jerusalem’s institutions by temporarily closing them down for periods ranging 
from three to twelve months, after which they would re-open. It also harassed the heads 
of the institutions, who formed a major cadre of Palestinian leadership prior to the Oslo 
accords. The role of the late Faisal Husseini and Orient House comes immediately to 
mind, but one should also acknowledge the part played by professional and labor unions, 
the press, and women’s associations when evaluating the role civil society played in 
preserving the relative independence of Jerusalem society from the Israeli establishment. 
It is true that this applied to all the occupied territories prior to Oslo, but the phenomenon 
was deeper and more obvious in Jerusalem, considering Israel’s systematic annexation 
in the city and the difference between it and the other occupied territories with respect 
to legal status.
Following the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in 1994, the campaign to 
suppress Jerusalem’s institutions intensified. To a large extent this was accompanied 
Jerusalem Quarterly 62  [ 19 ]
by closing off Jerusalem to Palestinians through setting up checkpoints on the roads 
connecting the city with the other regions of the West Bank, and through Israel’s issuance 
of a decree barring West Bank and Gaza residents from entering Jerusalem (in accordance 
with the decree regulating entry into Israel) without a permit issued either by Israel’s civil 
or military administrations.28 The suppression of institutions took various forms, including:
·	 Charging them with failing to abide by Israeli regulations for the management of 
non-governmental organizations;
·	 charging them with receiving support from the Palestinian Authority, or being in 
contact with hostile parties;
·	 charging them with organizing activities opposed to Israel;
·	 imposing multiple taxes on them with the aim of driving them into bankruptcy. 
The so-called minister of public security would issue a decree closing down an institution 
for a year, and would then renew the closure every year. Such was the fate of many of 
Jerusalem’s institutions, being closed down either by decree of the occupation authorities 
or as a result of the lack of funding. Many institutions also moved to the West Bank, and 
to Ramallah in particular, because of Israel’s policies of suppression, the difficulty of 
operating within Jerusalem, and the near impossibility of maintaining ties with the rest 
of the West Bank. Between 2000 and 2014, Israel issued orders to close around forty of 
Jerusalem’s institutions, with Orient House, the Palestinian Chamber of Commerce, and 
the Arab Higher Council for Tourism topping the list, along with many other institutions 
working in development, youth and social affairs, and sports.29 With the closure of these 
institutions, Jerusalem lost thousands of job opportunities as well as an important part of its 
independence from the Israeli establishment, facilitating the process of eating up the city. 
It is worth noting that loss at the level of national character and identity is no less painful 
than other losses. The closure of Jerusalem’s institutions also eliminated opportunities for 
the emergence of national and social leaders, as well as part of Jerusalem’s Palestinians’ 
capacity to initiate action and strike back against the occupation, to resist it and oppose 
its regulatory measures.
Education
In 2014, there were around ten thousand Palestinian children in Jerusalem without 
schools.30 This does not mean that those children are out in the streets, although a 
portion of them would be. West Bank schools managed to absorb them, since Jerusalem 
schools have very limited capacity. Two-thirds of Jerusalem’s Palestinian pupils are now 
studying at schools run by the Israeli establishment. This has a far-reaching effect on 
national identity. Nor is it certain that these children are enjoying reasonable learning 
opportunities: most of them will eventually drop out of school at one stage or the other. It 
must be said that a high proportion of Jerusalem’s pupils attend schools where the Israeli 
municipality of Jerusalem entrusts the process of education to contractors because it is 
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unable, or more accurately unwilling, to provide sufficient schools. Learning conditions 
suffer in unsuitable buildings and with heavy reliance on retired or unqualified teachers. 
Hence the greater part of those pupils will turn to the Israeli job market at an early age, 
with less than modest educational attainment.
Much has been written about education in Jerusalem and the challenges that the youth 
of the city face in preserving their national identity. More than half of them do not receive 
even the minimum amount of instruction in civics that students typically receive the 
world over. Israel has expunged many components of the Palestinian curriculum taught 
in Jerusalem and stripped it of all national dimensions. Furthermore, conditions in many 
schools are off-putting and discouraging to students. Instead of a lengthy exposition 
on the state of education in Palestinian Jerusalem, it may be enough to say that 3,055 
classrooms are needed to meet the city’s needs.31 This alone should be cause for nation-
wide concern about the future of Jerusalem’s youth.32
New Laws: Raising the Level of Suppression
New laws are being legislated and old ones activated in order to increase the pressure 
on Jerusalem’s Palestinian residents and to intensify their suppression. A great number 
of surveillance cameras are now spread over all parts of Arab Jerusalem. These are no 
longer limited to the Old City, as they had been more than a decade ago; surveillance 
cameras are now being installed in most of the city’s Palestinian neighborhoods and its 
various streets and intersections, so that the residents of Jerusalem are now constantly 
under observation, from the minute they leave their homes until they return to them.
Also underway is the activation of, or rather threats of activating, the law of absentee 
property. This law was issued in 1950 with the aim of appropriating the property of 
Palestinians who were expelled or fled in 1948, leaving behind their homes, lands, 
and personal property.33 After 1967, the law was applied to territory annexed by Israel, 
especially the eastern sector of Jerusalem. There, Israel began to confiscate the property 
of Jerusalemites whose place of residence had been found to be outside Palestine. The 
novelty was in the attempt to apply this law to property in Jerusalem owned by West Bank 
residents. Let us assume that an Abu Dis resident owns a plot of land or a building in the 
western part of Abu Dis, which was annexed to Jerusalem after 1967: his property would 
now be classified as absentee property, even if he resides only a few meters away from it.
The issue of the law of absentee property was raised once again in 2004, when some 
residents of Bethlehem and Bayt Jala appealed to the Israeli courts to be allowed access to 
land they owned that was swallowed up by the racist separation wall. They were informed 
that their land was appropriated because it was absentee property, and hence was placed 
under the authority of the guardian of absentee property. This alerted people to Israel’s 
intention to apply the law of absentee property in Jerusalem when the absentees in such 
cases were West Bank residents. Large swathes of privately-owned land belonging to 
Bayt Sahur residents were also appropriated for the purpose of building the settlement 
of Har Homa on Jabal Abu Ghunaym.
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Israel has temporarily halted the use of the law of absentee property, since it is able 
to exploit other regulations to the same effect. This does not mean that the law has 
been abrogated; rather, it should be regarded as a serious threat to thousands of real 
estate holdings in Jerusalem. It should be recalled that much real estate in Jerusalem is 
collectively owned by multiple family members and was never divided among the heirs. 
In many of these cases, one or more of the heirs resides outside Palestine and owns shares 
of the family legacy. If the law of absentee property is implemented, those shares will be 
turned over to the guardian of absentee property, who can dispose of them as he wishes. 
In the past this “guardian” has transferred the ownership of real estate in the Old City to 
settler associations, and allotted other land to the building of settlements.34
The Shepherd Hotel in Shaykh Jarrah is a good example. The hotel consists of a historic 
building belonging to the late Palestinian leader Hajj Amin al-Husseini. Israel seized it in 
1967, and despite the fact that Hajj Amin’s heirs continue to live in Jerusalem, the guardian 
of absentee property sold the building to a settlement company that is converting it to a 
residential complex consisting of twenty housing units for Jewish settlers. Construction 
began in 2011.35 The Husseini family attempted to challenge this venture in the Israeli 
courts but did not succeed, their efforts yielding no results. A similar case is the house 
of ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Husseini, located only a few steps away from Orient House, which 
was also appropriated in 1967 on the pretext that it is absentee property, despite his son 
Faisal’s presence in the city.
With respect to settlement construction, the Israeli cabinet formed a three-member 
“Committee for the Completion of Plans,” made up of one representative each from 
the Israeli Ministry of the Interior, the Regional Planning and Building Committee, and 
the District Planning and Building Committee. The purpose of this was to push for the 
approval of the largest possible number of settlement projects in Jerusalem prior to the 
March 2015 general elections. The aim was to create many facts on the ground before any 
political changes could take place. The plans presented to the committee included various 
settlements in Jerusalem and its environs. The formation of this committee reveals not only 
settler voracity, but also the disposition of the major players in the coalition government, 
and its intention to inflict collective punishment on the Palestinian residents of Jerusalem.36 
In addition, the second half of 2014 saw a bundle of racist bills put before the Knesset all 
of which aim at tightening control over Palestinians living in Israel and Jerusalem.37 One 
of these, referred to as the law for “the Judaizing of state and citizenship,” may be seen 
as the epitome of racist legislation and has become a subject of political debate in Israel. 
In a different context, Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, stated on 22 
November 2014 that he would propose legislation aimed at stripping Jerusalem residents 
of their residency rights, and revoking all social benefits for those who commit acts against 
Israel.38 There is also the law of home demolition for Arabs who commit acts against Israeli 
security, the law against stone-throwing, the law allowing Jews to pray at the Temple Mount, 
and other laws under consideration, all of which aim at tightening control over Jerusalem.
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Al-Aqsa Mosque: A Powder Keg
Confrontations between Palestinians and Israelis erupted before in Jerusalem and 
elsewhere because of an assault on the Noble Sanctuary, an extremely sensitive site 
over which sentiments run very high. It is also one of the last remaining Palestinian 
strongholds in Jerusalem, and the embodiment of many religious and national symbols. 
Israel followed its policy towards the Noble Sanctuary slowly and cautiously, piling up 
its gains through gradually taking control of the sacred precinct away from the Jerusalem 
waqf, so that now the Israeli police have total control over who is allowed to enter the 
Noble Sanctuary.
Visiting the Noble Sanctuary never presented a problem in the past, despite the recurrent 
assaults on it in the 1970s and 1980s. Attacks were individual occurrences, including the 
arson attack on the al-Aqsa mosque in 1969, attacks on the Dome of the Rock, and the 
discovery of explosives in different parts of the sacred precinct. The problem rose to the 
surface when dedicated Zionist movements and groups were formed, loudly proclaiming 
their call for demolishing the al-Aqsa mosque and building the Jewish Temple in its 
place. Even this was not seen as posing a direct threat to the Noble Sanctuary, since the 
waqf did not close the sacred precinct to Jewish visitors. However the problem gradually 
escalated, with encouragement from the ruling establishment. This became manifest with 
Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Noble Sanctuary in 2000, whereby official policy brought the 
sacred precinct to the center of the conflict, furthering its use as a source of incitement 
in Israeli domestic politics. Additionally, continuing with archeological excavations and 
the digging of tunnels in the areas surrounding the Noble Sanctuary, and charging settler 
groups with the task of managing nearby archaeological sites, contributed to putting the 
Noble Sanctuary in truly imminent danger.
For three years now, Jewish “visits” to the sacred precinct have not had a touristic 
character. They have become acts of provocation to Muslim sentiments regarding the 
site; they include attempts to conduct prayers there, along with making proclamations 
opposed to the existence of the sacred precinct. What made things even worse were the 
recurrent visits of members of the Israeli cabinet and the Knesset, who delivered incendiary 
statements about the future of the Noble Sanctuary and the right of the Jews to return to 
the “Temple Mount.” These were accompanied by religious opinions uttered by many 
rabbis sanctioning such activities and aspirations. Now there are dedicated groups, not far 
removed from the Israeli cabinet and its coalition – in fact rather representative of them 
– who are organizing “visits” with government support and under tight guard by heavily 
armed Israeli police and border guards. These occur regularly, with some groups even 
visiting the Noble Sanctuary more than once a day in order to create the impression of a 
continuous and permanent Jewish presence.39 During these visits, the police and border 
guards commit acts meant to provoke worshippers and students in the courtyards of the 
Noble Sanctuary. A recent development is the appearance of a clear agenda, officially and 
openly backed by the Israeli government, for discussing the sharing of time and space at 
the sacred precinct, on the model of what was done at the Ibrahimi Sanctuary in Hebron.
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In 2002, Israel announced that it would treat the plazas of the Haram area as “national 
parks,” with open access to all. The waqf would no longer have any authority over these 
spaces, its authority limited to roofed buildings only. This was in blatant violation of the 
historical status quo, which is that the Noble Sanctuary comprises 144 dunams including 
its outer walls, gates, all structures within it and beneath its ground, all its yards and 
gardens, and all buildings overlooking it from the northern and western sides, since all 
these were waqf holdings. The waqf administrators declared this time and again, referring 
in various statements to the clear stipulations of British Mandate regulations.40
Conversely, Israel tightened its grip on the Noble Sanctuary, taking complete control 
of all activity within it and all aspects of entrance to it, including who is allowed to enter, 
at what times, and through which entrances. Large groups were denied entry into the 
sacred precinct and forbidden from praying within it at certain times. Palestinian guards 
were subjected to harassment and waqf authorities were not allowed to bring anything 
into the sacred precinct – not a book or a computer or a bag of cement – without a 
permit from the Israeli police, who rule over the location like absolute lords. There is a 
continuous concentrated presence of heavily armed police and border guards at the gates 
to the sacred precinct and in its open spaces. Despite this, the southern, covered part of 
the al-Aqsa mosque was broken into on 5 November 2014 and smoke bombs, tear gas 
canisters, and concussion bombs were set off within it, desecrations that had never taken 
place before.41 This assault further provoked the feelings of the residents of Jerusalem.
Israel misread the situation at the Noble Sanctuary, failing to understand its effect 
on Palestinians and Arabs generally, and underestimating the feelings aroused. There is 
definitely a strong link between popular action in Jerusalem and what goes on at the Noble 
Sanctuary. As long as Israel adheres to its present policy, the sacred precinct will remain 
a cause of further confrontation between the Palestinians and Israel. It is true that there 
are now Israeli voices calling for restraining the “Temple Mount” movements, and for 
preventing Knesset members and ministers from using the place for political purposes. 
These voices were raised in response to the attempted assassination of the extremist Rabbi 
Yehuda Glick on 29 October 2014,42 and the attack on the synagogue of the settlement of 
Har Nof on 18 November 2014.43 Among those calling for calm was the prime minister, 
Netanyahu, who had been pressured by the European Union and the United States. 
European reaction in this case went beyond its typical response,44 and Jordan withdrew 
its ambassador from Tel Aviv and lodged a complaint with the UN Security Council.45
Two Separate Cities
The Israelis are once more discovering, after 47 years, that annexing the eastern half 
of Jerusalem to the western half was a total delusion. They could neither dominate the 
city nor unite it. The city remains Palestinian Arab in essence, appearance, and identity. 
A quick look at Jerusalem suffices to reveal that outwardly there are two cities, living 
apart; the services that are shared do not conceal essential differences. A look at the Israeli 
yearbook of statistics also reveals huge differences in services, infrastructures, education, 
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health and cultural services, and public parks. The difference in urban expansion and 
residential construction grows ever wider.46 The contrast, which the residents of Jerusalem 
experience daily, has become, in principle, unacceptable. Most of East Jerusalem has 
come to resemble a shantytown, or is rapidly turning into one. Yet despite this, the settlers 
continue to fight for it. Meanwhile West Jerusalem is a modern city, developing every day.
For over a year, Jerusalem has occupied a good share of the news. Since the murder 
of sixteen-year-old Mohammed Abu Khdeir on 2 July 2014,47 militant action in various 
forms has been taking place in the different quarters of the city, despite the concentrated 
use of the numerous instruments of suppression that has extended to most neighborhoods 
and led to mass arrests that included children under the age of ten.48 These detentions 
continue at an increasing rate, so that not a day passes without mass arrests that sweep 
up women gathered in al-Aqsa mosque, youth leaders, and the families of fighters, 
including minors.49 So far the Israeli occupiers have failed to take complete control of 
Jerusalem. A series of security and political meetings have been held to that end, and 
measures taken that violate international law, including firing live bullets at people setting 
off firecrackers. Israeli news media talk incessantly about the situation, as if there were 
anything surprising in it, and proposing new forms of suppression that Israeli official 
agencies have started to discuss. Israeli leaders have loudly threatened the people of 
Jerusalem with collective punishment, which in fact has become a tangible, lived reality. 
Among such punishments are: accelerating the pattern of demolishing homes built 
without permits;50 arresting the families of stone-throwing children; demolishing the 
homes of those who launch guerrilla operations in Jerusalem; restricting the conditions 
for passing through the checkpoints between Jerusalem and the rest of the West Bank, 
through which nearly 100,000 residents of Jerusalem pass daily, so that these conditions 
have become more humiliating than before; giving traffic police a free hand to torment 
Jerusalem drivers for the most trivial reasons or for no reason at all; launching a vicious 
tax campaign in which the departments of the ministry of finance and the municipality 
conspire; and revoking the identity cards of Jerusalem residents and denying them their 
human and natural right to live in their city, the city of their ancestors.
One thing over which no discussion or debate has taken place among the Israeli security 
apparatus is seeing the current situation in Jerusalem as a result of almost five decades of 
Israeli occupation of the city – of neglect, marginalization, suppression, impoverishment, 
and diminishing services. The Israeli belief was that as long as the city’s Palestinians 
live under better conditions than those prevalent in the West Bank, they will accept their 
reality. This delusion has now been revealed. While it is true that the motivation for 
activism in Jerusalem, including the protection of the al-Aqsa mosque, is nationalist, this 
alone cannot adequately explain the months-long phenomenon without comprehending 
the socio-economic conditions that prevail in the city.
Finally, it is worth pointing out that despite the manifold mechanisms of expulsion 
employed by the occupation in Jerusalem to get rid of the maximum number of 
Palestinians, they now constitute nearly forty percent of the population of what is called 
“united Jerusalem,” when they had numbered under twenty percent in 1967. This important 
demographic fact will be one of the major factors in determining the future of the city.
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